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Nudging Websites: A Proposal for a Hybrid
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I. INTRODUCTION
Copying digital content on the Internet is becoming cheaper and
easier. For example, there is a proliferation of news aggregation
services and bloggers who make unauthorized copies of copyrighted
content, such as news articles or celebrity pictures. As a result,
publishers such as newspapers are struggling. A recent study showed
that the number of views for such unauthorized off-site content is
140% of that for the original content., The revenue of newspapers,
which comes mostly from advertising, is thus constantly being eroded
by unauthorized copies on infringing websites. There are also online
marketplaces, such as BizReef.com, which provide a forum for
freelancers to bid for "web cloning" projects.2 Web cloning refers to
the copying of a website verbatim. The solicitations often come from
small businesses that wish to establish an online store on a limited
budget. The small business would identify a website to be "cloned,"
* Jin-Won Jung is an associate at the law firm of Michael Best & Friedrich LLP in Chicago,
Illinois; J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law; Ph.D., Northwestern University. The author
wishes to thank Professor Edward Lee for providing helpful comments and Eun Jung for
her support.
' Attributor Analyzes TrueAudience, PLAGIARISM TODAY (Nov. 19, 2008),
http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2008/11/19/attributor-analyzes-trueaudience. During
September 2008, the firm Attributor analyzed content of various categories from over loo
publisher sites. The auto content category showed the largest number of off-site views-
almost six times more views than that for the original content.
2 BIZREEF-FREELANCE MARKETPLACE FOR CUSTOMERS AND FREELANCE PROFESSIONALS,
http://www.bizreef.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) (search "web cloning").
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typically from one of its competitors, and the web designer then copies
the website content describing certain products or services.
Although a copyright owner could file a civil lawsuit against the
infringing website, litigation is typically expensive and can take
several years. In the recent case of Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon &
Recordon, a law firm alleged that another law firm used copyrighted
information from its website.3 In fact, the defendant law firm
plagiarized the plaintiff law firm's website verbatim.4 The litigation,
however, continued for approximately six years, with parties arguing
about whether venue was proper.5 The Ninth Circuit eventually
resolved the issue in favor of the plaintiff,6 but a dissenting judge left
the door open for future debates.7 As this case illustrates, it is not easy
to enforce copyright on the Internet due to procedural issues, such as
establishing a proper venue. In the rapidly changing digital world, the
commercial life of the digital content could expire by the time the dust
settles.
To promote the creation of original work,8 copyright must be
enforceable, regardless of whether the work exists online or offline.
Copyright is the body of law relating to the right of authors to control
the reproduction of their intellectual creations.9 It incentivizes the
creation of original worko and thereby drives the proliferation of
knowledge. The primary incentive is the grant of exclusive rights to
the author, which enhances the probability that the author will make a
3 Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2010).
4 Id. at 1127.
s Id. at 1126. In copyright infringement actions, venue is proper "in the district in which the
defendant ... resides or may be found." 28 U.S.C. § 140o(a) (2009). Brayton Purcell was
based in Novato, California in the Northern District of California, while Recordon &
Recordon was based in San Diego, California in the Southern District of California.
6 Id. at 1131.
7 Id. at 1135 ("Under the majority's opinion, every website operator faces the potential that
he will be hailed into far-away courts based upon allegations of intellectual property
infringement .... ") (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349
(1991).
9 BLACK'S LAw DIciONARY 361 (8th ed. 2004).
10 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503,
506 (1945) ("The primary purpose of copyright is, of course, to benefit the author.").
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profit." Rather than begrudging this profit motive, copyright law
celebrates it;12 profit motive is an economic engine that ensures a
public benefit.13 This very incentive would also ensure the same public
benefit on the Internet. To enforce copyright on the Internet, however,
society needs to offer some kind of forum for efficient dispute
resolution that takes into account the fast-paced nature of the
Internet. Various means of government intervention have been
proposed to this end.14 Government intervention, however, would
likely call for amending copyright law, which will take time.15 Precious
government resources would need to be devoted to implementation
and execution. Even if implemented, government intervention would
not address transnational jurisdictional problems. Procedural issues,
as seen in Brayton Purcell, would only be exacerbated in a
transnational setting. Any proposal limited to a domestic reach would
not address the increasingly global nature of copyright infringement
on the Internet.
This article will propose a hybrid regulatory scheme to enforce
online copyright. The hybrid regulatory scheme will address the
shortcomings of the current public-law framework by providing a
quicker and more efficient solution. Part I of this article will outline
past proposals on copyright dispute resolution and the problems
presented by these proposals. Part II will detail the proposed hybrid
regulatory scheme. Part III will discuss potential criticisms of the
proposed hybrid regulatory scheme.
Id. at 507 ("[A]s in the case of patents, the Constitution takes the unusual course of
expressly sanctioning a gain by private persons. Authors, musicians, painters are among
the greatest benefactors of the race. So we incline to protect them.").
12 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The
copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the
exploitation of copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the
proliferation of knowledge.") (emphasis added).
13 Id. ("The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.").
'4 See infra Parts I.B. & I.C.
15 For example, in 2003, the Public Domain Enhancement Act was introduced to solve the
orphan works problem of copyright law. H.R. 2601, 1o8th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003). The
proposed Act was found to be violative of the Berne Convention's prohibition on
formalities, and was not enacted. The Act was reintroduced in 2005, H.R. 2408, lo9th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2005), but again not enacted. More than eight years after the initial
introduction of the bill, there is still no legislation to solve the orphan works problem.
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II. PAST PROPOSALS ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION ARE FRAUGHT WITH
PROCEDURAL UNCERTAINTIES
Recognizing the inordinate time and money involved in traditional
copyright litigation, there have been proposals for more efficient
forums targeting online copyright disputes. These proposals have
mostly focused on music file sharing on peer-to-peer networks, rather
than on infringements occurring on websites through web cloning or
news aggregation.16 Although the circumstances of infringement are
different, the procedural issues are similar. Past proposals tried to
address the procedural uncertainty through amendments to U.S.
copyright law.'7 As we will see, however, the past proposals become
ineffective in a transnational setting and present other issues by
placing too great a reliance on the public-law framework.
A. INTERNET REGULATION: PUBLIC V. PRIVATE
To discuss regulatory policies for enforcing copyright on the
Internet, a good starting point is to review the current regulatory
system for the Internet, including the agency regulating the Internet.
As a descriptive matter, regulators of the Internet include a set of
diverse actors: public actors, like governmental institutions, or private
actors, like Internet protocol developers. These regulators interact in
complex ways and thereby provide some amount of informal
regulation in addition to whatever law applies. Over the past decade,
scholars have recognized certain advantages of public regulation over
private regulation 8 and vice versa.19 As a prescriptive matter, there
seems to be simply no consensus on the subject of who ought to
regulate the Internet. The right balance between private and public
regulation shall be addressed before delving into regulatory policies to
enforce copyright online. The tension between private and public
regulation has long been recognized. The issue has often been framed
16 See infra Parts I.B. & I.C.
17 Id.
1 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 136-37 (2006) (questioning the
government's practice of vesting "policy-making power in bodies outside the democratic
process").
19 See, e.g., David G. Post, What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2000) (advocating "the widest possible scope for
uncoordinated and uncoerced individual choice" for the regulation of the internet).
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in terms of market versus government. Most recently, professors
Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein advanced a so-called "nudge
theory" showing how the government can provide some guidance to
efficiently solve problems occurring in a market economy.20 They
argued that to help private actors make better choices, the
government could intervene without jeopardizing freedom of choice.21
For example, companies could be free to pollute the environment, but
the government may nudge them towards polluting less by publishing
a list of significant polluters on the EPA's website.22 Such nudges
deliberately exploit various biases in human judgment, such as status
quo or loss aversion, which are rooted in our cognitive systems. 2 3
People hate losses about twice as much as they like gains,24 and a
choice-architecture system can be constructed with close reference to
this bias in human judgment.25 The nudge theory strikes a delicate
balance between private and public regulation by paternalistically
nudging people through a choice-architecture that does not eliminate
or reduce freedom of choice.
Professor Henry H. Perritt, Jr. proposed a regulation scheme for
the Internet26 that is consistent with the nudge theory. In a so-called
"hybrid regulation" scheme, private regulatory regimes are combined
with public-law frameworks.27 As in the brick-and-mortar world, there
has been tension on the issue of market versus government regulation
20 See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOuT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (rev. and expanded ed., 2009).
21 Id. at 255-56.
22 See id. at 192-93 (touting the Toxic Release Inventory, an information disclosure
requirement in an environmental law enacted in 1986, as "the most unambiguous success
story in all of environmental law").
23 Id. at 33-35.
24 Id. at 33-34 (citing Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. OF POL. ECON.
1325 (1990)).
25 See, e.g., id. at 114 (explaining the success of the "Save More Tomorrow" plan which
exploits the bias of people who "hate to see their paychecks go down").
26 Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 215 (2001).
27 Id. at 250 ("Hybrid regulation signifies regulatory regimes in which broad public law
frameworks allow private regulatory regimes to work out the details.").
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of the Internet. Professor David G. Post advocated "the widest possible
scope for uncoordinated and uncoerced individual choice"' for the
regulation of the Internet.28 According to Post, self-regulatory efforts
are aggregated in "the market," which in turn will foster a plenitude of
fundamental values.29 Professor Lawrence Lessig disagreed and
argued that such fundamental user interests may be too important to
be left to the market.3o The hybrid regulation scheme is a tertium
quid, and provides for the oversight of the government in a framework
that relies on the self-regulation of private actors.
The hybrid regulation scheme has two major elements: (1)
delegation of power from public to private regulators, and (2) a
mechanism to assure accountability. Perritt illustrates these elements
through the example of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers ("ICANN"). ICANN is a private, nonprofit corporation
formed in 1998 to generally manage the Internet domain-name
system ("DNS").31 The DNS is the key to Internet user-friendliness.
The DNS "serves as the 'phone book' for the Internet" by finding a
numerical network addreSS32 corresponding to a user-friendly domain
name such as "www.example.com."33 When a user computer looks up
a domain name, a query is sent to find a top-level domain server. 34
Top-level domains are the last part of the domain name, such as .edu,
.com, .gov, .org, .net, .int, and .mil.35 The top-level domain server,
called the "root server," is controlled by the U.S. Department of
Commerce. The Commerce Department has delegated its power to
control the root server to the private regulator ICANN through a
memorandum of understanding. This delegation of power illustrates
the first element of a hybrid regulation scheme.
28 Post, supra note 19, at 1440.
29 Id.
30 Lessig, supra note 18, at 136-37, 337-38.
31 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BoRDERLESS WORLD 168 (2oo6).
32 This would look like 208.77.188.166.
33 Domain Name System, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wild/DomainNameSystem (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
34 Id.
35 Top-Level Domains (gTLDs), ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/tlds (last visited Feb.
18, 2012).
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The delegation of power was a success because ICANN effectively
solved transnational jurisdictional problems thanks to its exclusive
technological control over the top-level domain names.36 In late 1999,
ICANN promulgated the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy ("UDRP") for a narrow class of disputes between domain-name
registrants and trademark owners. 37 The UDRP establishes online
procedureS38 that allow trademark owners to recapture domain names
held by persons who, in bad faith,39 register and use domain names
containing those marks. ICANN selected the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") as the UDRP's first dispute-
settlement provider.4o There are now three other accredited providers:
36 Perritt, supra note 26, at 220.
37 Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The
Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 141,
149 (2001).
38 Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
39 The UDRP enumerates the following as evidence of the bad-faith registration of a
domain name:
(i) circumstances indicating that [the domain name holder] ha[s] registered or ...
acquired the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise
transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the owner of the
trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable
consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the
domain name; or
(ii) [the domain name holder] ha[s] registered the domain name in order to prevent
the owner of the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding
domain name, provided that [the domain name holder] ha[s] engaged in a pattern of such
conduct; or
(iii) [the domain name holder] ha[s] registered the domain name primarily for the
purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) by using the domain name, [the domain name holder] ha[s] intentionally
attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to [the domain name holder's]
web site or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the
complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of [the
domain name holder's] web site or location or of a product or service on [the domain name
holder's] web site or location.
Id. at 4.b.
40 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 37, at 187.
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(1) the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre; (2) the
National Arbitration Forum; and (3) the Czech Arbitration Court.41
The UDRP resolves domain name trademark disputes at a panelist fee
of $1,500-$2,ooo each (not including the participants' legal fees)42
and an average time of a little more than a month.43 Thus, the UDRP
provides a faster and cheaper alternative than courtroom litigation.44
Perritt points out that ICANN, however, lacks a mechanism to
assure accountability. ICANN is accountable only to the Commerce
Department, which has a vested interest in declaring its delegation of
DNS management to be a success. Perritt argues that ICANN should
be more accountable to protect democratic values.45 To this end,
judicial review should be permitted.46 There may be other
mechanisms to assure accountability, such as legislation.47 However,
41 Approved Providers for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/approved-providers.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
The International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution and eResolution were
once listed as providers, but they no longer accept complaints. Former Providers for
Umiform Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/en/dndr/udrp/former-providers.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
42 See Schedule of Fees under the UDRP (valid as of Dec. 1, 2002),
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/fees/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). The
fee for filing a complaint with one domain name in front of a single panelist is $1,500. Id.
For a complaint in front of three panelists, the fee is $4,000, id., which will be evenly split
by the defendant and the complainant. Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy,
supra note 38.
43 Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for Resolving
Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 2 (2005).
44 An action can be brought under section 43(d) of the Lanham Act for registration,
trafficking, or use of a domain name confusingly similar to or dilutive of a trademark of
personal name. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2010). About 342 cases were brought under section
43(d) of the Lanham Act from 1999 to 2007. In comparison, there were 18,754 UDRP
proceedings in a similar timeframe. Search Index of UDRP Proceedings, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/cgi-bin/udrp/udrp.cgi (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
45 Perritt, supra note 26, at 221 (noting as disadvantages of private regulation that it "can
fail to protect democratic values" and "is usually less accountable than traditional
government regulation").
46 Id. at 269 ("Constitutional restrictions on delegation of legislative or adjudicatory power
require channeling of the delegated power and judicial review of private decisions in the
regular courts.") (citation omitted).
47 Id. at 317-18 (citing Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive:
Congressional Delegations ofAdministrative Authority Outside the Federal Government,
85 Nw. U. L. REv. 62, 67 (1990)).
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legislation requires individual willpower and a significant amount of
political support and may not be more than a "theoretical
possibility;"48 thus the need for judicial review.
As detailed below in Part II of this article, I propose to apply
hybrid regulation to effectively nudge websites so as to reduce the
potential for copyright infringement cases. There have been proposals
in the past addressing some aspects of online copyright dispute
resolution, but as will be shown in the following sections, these
proposals have largely provided a one-sided view based on public
regulation and have fallen short for that reason.
B. THE LEMLEY/REESE PROPOSAL ON PUBLIC REGULATION:
ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR P2P
To help copyright owners enforce their rights against infringers on
peer-to-peer networks, professors Mark Lemley and R. Anthony Reese
proposed a copyright dispute resolution system modeled after the
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy ("UDRP") for
Internet domain-name disputes.49 They argued that their proposed
system would "provide a quicker, lower-cost alternative for copyright
owners to enforce their rights against individual large-scale infringers
on [peer-to-peer] networks."50 Under their system, copyright owners
could either '"pursu[e] a civil copyright infringement claim in federal
court" or "pursu[e] a claim in an administrative dispute resolution
proceeding before an administrative law judge in the Copyright
Office."5 Like the UDRP, the proposed system would be available only
for "relatively straightforward claims" of copyright infringement
where "evidence shows that the person targeted has uploaded at least
fifty copyrighted works during any thirty day period."52 Their
proposed system would automatically exclude any case, without
prejudice, when the defendant presents complicated legal or factual
48 Id. at 318 (also noting that it may be a "thin reed" to expect a legislative response to an
abuse of private regulatory power).
49 Lemley & Reese, supra note 43, at 1-2.
50 Id. at 9.
5' Id. at 3-4; see also id. at 19 (draft statute to implement the proposed system).
52 Lemley & Reese, supra note 43, at 4 (citation omitted); see also id. at 18 (draft statute to
implement the proposed system).
JUNG2012] 157
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
issues, such as plausible mistaken identity or fair use defenses.53
Furthermore, their proposed system would forgo formal discovery and
instead rely on evidence that each party presents on paper.54
Copyright owners must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting copyright infringement, for example, with "screen shots
showing the availability of files and a sworn statement that the
copyright owner determined that the titles listed were actually
available and were actually copies of the copyrighted works."55 A
monetary penalty of $250 would be imposed per work infringed to
deter others from engaging in large-scale uploading.56
Lemley and Reese argued that their proposed system would
"avoid[] the obvious mistakes of the UDRP."57 To this end, the
proposed system would permit an administrative appeal.58
Additionally, it would exclude any case where the respondent may
raise a plausible mistaken identity or fair use defense because
"[r]esolution of such factual disputes is better handled in an ordinary
court proceeding."59
However, the Lemley/Reese proposal has several structural
problems. First, the proposed administrative dispute resolution
system is under-inclusive. The system would exclude online
infringements that have not taken place on a peer-to-peer network.
More fundamentally, however, the proposal suffers from the generic
problems that exist in any framework relying heavily on the public
regulation of the Internet; namely, a failure to account for the
transaction costs of a legislative solution.
Public regulation, or government intervention, would likely call for
amending copyright laws. 60 This means that their proposal would
53 Lemley & Reese, supra note 43, at 6-8.
54 Id. at 9 ("Both parties should have an opportunity to present evidence and argument
online, but there should not be face-to-face argument or discovery of the sort that exists in
civil litigation."); see also id. at 19 (draft statute to implement the proposed system).
55 Lemley & Reese, supra note 43, at 4-5.
56 Id. at 1o; see also id. at 20 (draft statute to implement the proposed system).
57 Id. at 9.
58 Id. at 8.
59 Id. at 6-7.
60 Note that Lemley & Reese drafted a statute to implement the proposed system in 2005.
To date, the statute has not been introduced by Congress.
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require devoting precious government resources to both
implementation and execution. As to the implementation, the
legislative process would entail congressional hearings and floor
debates, numerous markup sessions to analyze, rewrite, and amend
the bill, and also various reports from conference committees. 61 While
this legislative process may appear to entail typical transaction costs
that society must bear in any legislation, copyright legislation
specifically is further complicated by the legislative capture of current
copyright stakeholders. 62 For over a century, Congress and the
Copyright Office have depended on multilateral negotiations among
industry representatives to draft a copyright bill.63 One problem with
this drafting process is that no affected industry is going to agree on a
new bill that leaves it worse off than under the current law.64 The
prelegislative interindustry negotiation can stall efforts to write
copyright amendments 65 and render the implementation of the
proposal not much more than a theoretical possibility.
Additionally, as to the execution, the Lemley/Reese proposal
would require staffing administrative law judges in the Copyright
Office, which would impose a burden on taxpayers. None of these
costs are accounted for in their proposal. In light of the transaction
costs, the merit of their proposal is substantially lessened, and even if
implemented after the legislative process, their proposed system
would leave the transnational jurisdictional problems unaddressed.
C. THE CIOLLI PROPOSAL ON PUBLIC REGULATION:
FEDERAL SMALL-CLAIMS COURT
Anthony Ciolli addressed some of these structural problems and
proposed a modification to the Lemley/Reese administrative dispute-
61 Otto von Bismarck is reported to have said that "[1]aws are like sausages. It's better not to
see them being made." Quote Details: Otto von Bismarck, THE QUOTATIONS PAGE,
http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/27759.htmi (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
6 2 See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23-28 (2006), available at
http://works.bepress.com/jessicalitman/5.
63 See generally id. at 35-63.
64 Id. at 23.
65See, e.g., id. at 36.
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resolution system.66 Under Ciolli's system, "administrative law judges
who possess the appropriate expertise" will hear all copyright
infringement cases in a federal small-claims court. 67 Ciolli's system
would not be limited to straightforward claims of copyright
infringement. Instead, all potential defenses would be considered,
"including mistaken identity, fair use, and copyright misuse."68 The
hearing may be conducted "through the internet or telephone or, if
both parties are not geographically distant ... in-person at a mutually
agreed upon location." 69 "To protect against errors of the law by the
administrative judge," as well as "to preserve a litigant's Seventh
Amendment right to a trial by jury," the proposed system would
permit an appeal to the federal district court. 70 The federal district
court would review the appealed claim de novo. 71
While improving some aspects of the administrative dispute-
resolution system, the federal small-claims court system also has
significant problems. First, allowing all potential defenses is untenable
under the proposed system, which forgoes formal discovery. Certain
defenses may raise factual disputes, which simply cannot be resolved
without the benefit of discovery. If the system is to provide a cheaper
alternative to litigation, however, discovery must be substantially
limited,72 and if discovery is limited, the scope of the claim or defense
must be limited accordingly. Fact-intensive defenses, such as fair use,
are not compatible with a low-cost dispute-resolution system.
Secondly, allowing all potential defenses would significantly retard the
66 See generally Anthony Ciolli, Lowering the Stakes: Toward a Model of Effective
Copyright Dispute Resolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 999 (2008).
67 Id. at 1024. Although Ciolli's small claims court is open to "all" copyright infringement
cases, Ciolli considers imposing a jurisdictional limit, specifically one as low as $ 5,000. Id.
at 1026.
68 Id. at 1024.
69 Id. (citation omitted).
70 Id. at 1025 (citation omitted).
71 Id. at 1024 n.149.
72 According to a survey conducted by the American Intellectual Property Law Association,
the cost of a copyright infringement suit through the end of discovery accounts for about
fifty to seventy percent of the total cost of the suit. See AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, 2007
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 35 (2007). For a copyright infringement suit with less
than one million dollars at stake, the median cost by the end of discovery was about
$150,000 for each side in 2007. Id.
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case flow in the small-claims court. Judges then would have to decide
how to allocate the scarce resources, and may need to resort to some
kind of triage to prevent overcrowding of the court. Lastly, similar to
the proposal for the administrative dispute-resolution system, the
proposal for the federal small-claims court system does not account
for the transaction costs of the legislative solution. And again, when
weighed against the transaction costs, the merit of their proposal is
substantially lessened. Moreover, even if implemented, the proposed
system would leave transnational jurisdictional problems
unaddressed.
1I. A PRIVATE BOARD UNDER ICANN WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE
As examined in Part I, proposals based on public regulation have
fallen short. The need remains for a quicker and more efficient
solution to enforce online copyright. In this part, I will propose a
hybrid regulatory scheme under ICANN to address the shortcomings
of the public-law framework. Similar to the Lemley/Reese proposal,
the proposed regulatory scheme is modeled after the UDRP by
ICANN, but liberally borrows certain elements from the self-
regulation process at the National Advertising Division ("NAD") of the
Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. to effectively nudge websites
towards less copyright infringement.
A. AN EXAMPLE OF HYBRID REGULATION: NAD FOR ADVERTISING
In the advertising industry, the NAD dispute-resolution process of
the Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. is a successful example of
hybrid regulation. The Council of Better Business Bureaus, a private
nonprofit corporation, is a trade association of marketers in the U.S.
and Canada.73 At the NAD, competent attorneyS74 review complaints
regarding on-line and off-line advertising5 to determine whether the
73See John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace
Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893, 947 n.216 (1999).
74 About NAD, NATIONAL ADVERTISING DIVISION,
http://www.nadreview.org/AboutNAD.aspx (last visited Jan. 8, 2012) ("The advertising
review specialists at NAD are experienced attorneys with expertise in claims
substantiation, advertising and trade regulation, litigation and arbitration.").
75 Id. ("NAD reviews only national advertisements-those ads disseminated on a
nationwide or broadly regional basis. The advertising may be placed on broadcast or cable
television, in radio, magazines and newspapers, on the Internet or commercial on-line
services, or provided direct to the home or office.").
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claims are truthful, not misleading, and substantiated. Upon review,
the NAD can make recommendations to modify or discontinue the
advertising.76 The process is voluntary, and about eighty percent of the
cases are brought by competitors.77 There is no discovery,78 which
relieves the participants of disruption to business and substantially
decreases cost. The filing fee is $3,500 for members of the Council of
Better Business Bureaus or $6,ooo-$20,OOO for non-members,
depending on the challenger's gross annual revenue. 79 The NAD
process allows for briefing and, if desired, conferences.so One of the
benefits of using the NAD process is the ability to obtain a thorough
review on the merits in only a fraction of the time litigation would
require. A decision is usually issued within about sixty days of a
challenge8' and is accompanied by a press release, which may
recommend that a company modify or discontinue its advertising.8 2
Marketers comply in about ninety-five percent (95%) of the cases, but
can appeal the decision to the National Advertising Review Board.83 In
the rare case that an advertiser refuses to comply with an NAD
decision, the NAD can forward the case to the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC"). 84 The FTC can file a complaint against the
advertiser for making false and unsubstantiated claims.85 The
advertiser can agree to settle the cases against it86 or proceed in
76 The Advertising Industry's Process of Voluntary Self-Regulation, THE NATIONAL
ADVERTISING REVIEW COUNCIL, 11 (2007), http://www.nadreview.org/o7_Procedures.pdf
(last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
77 All-Star Briefing, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE-NEWSLETTER (Practising Law Inst., New
York, N.Y.) (Sept. 22, 2005), http://media.whatcounts.com/pli/allstar/ASB3.35.htm.
78 id.
79 About NAD, supra note 74.
80 The Advertising Industry's Process of Voluntary Self-Regulation, supra note 76, at 4.
8 About NAD, supra note 74.
82 The Advertising Industry's Process of Voluntary Self-Regulation, supra note 76, at 7.
83 All-Star Briefing, supra note 77.
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Announces Actions Against Kmart,
Tender and Dyna-E, (June 9, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo9/o6/kmart.shtm.
86 Id. (noting that Kmart and Tender agreed to settle the cases against them).
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administrative litigation.87 Both elements of hybrid regulation are
thereby met in the NAD process: (1) the power to adjudicate is
delegated to a private entity, and (2) judicial review assures
accountability.
The NAD process is a good example of a social nudge. Although
compliance with the NAD decision is wholly voluntary, advertisers
almost always choose to comply. No company wants bad publicity88
following NAD's press release or to have their case referred to an
enforcement agency like the FTC. A referral to an enforcement agency
may create not only an immediate threat to the advertiser, but also
long-range concern about the stability of the self-regulation scheme
itself.89 An alternative to self-regulation is an increase in
governmental enforcement actions.90 Marketers may not be receptive
to the governmental scrutiny that accompanies such enforcement
actions. Competitive market pressures may thus form to foster the
self-regulation scheme and avoid the governmental scrutiny. Market
pressures can be a powerful social nudge. People generally care about
what others think about them and try to do what others do to avoid
irritating them or to gain their favor.91 Therefore, companies are more
likely to network and voluntarily adopt desirable public policies.92
This is perhaps why so many marketers voluntarily comply with the
NAD decision.
87 Id. (noting that the case against Dyna-E will be litigated). Dyna-E eventually settled the
case. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Settlement Bars Seller's Deceptive
'Biodegradable' Claims (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo9/o8/dyna.shtm.
88 See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 193 ("The bad publicity can result in all sorts of
harms, including lower stock prices.") (citation omitted).
89 Rothchild, supra note 73, at 947-48.
90 Id. ("Governments can encourage the development of self-regulatory regimes 'by
outlining the alternative increased regulatory and enforcement action that would be
required to address market failures if self-regulatory measures were not introduced,' by
'insist[ing] on adherence to voluntary codes as a condition of issuing a license,' or through
'allocation[s] of liability, that will induce networks themselves to adopt desirable public
policies."') (citation omitted).
91 Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 54.
92 Id.
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B. A PROPOSAL FOR A PRIVATE BOARD TO ENFORCE
COPYRIGHT ONLINE
A hybrid regulatory scheme for copyright under ICANN could
address the shortcomings of the current public-law framework. The
details of the proposal are set out in the following subsections. Below
is a brief summary of the proposed regulatory scheme.
The proposed scheme follows Perritt's hybrid regulation scheme
by delegating regulatory power to a private board and permitting
judicial review. The board will consist of three members and be
housed at dispute-settlement providers accredited by ICANN.93 Upon
finding online copyright infringement, a copyright holder may file a
complaint to the board.94 If the board finds the complaint sufficient,
the board will forward the complaint to the respondent.95 Within
twenty days of receipt of the complaint, the respondent must submit a
response to the dispute-settlement provider.96 Within sixty days of
receipt of the complaint, the three-member board will issue a decision
in writing.97
If the board finds infringement, the decision is a recommendation
to take down the infringing content, as in the NAD process.98 The
take-down recommendation of the proposed board would be similar
to that under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
("DMCA").99 Under the DMCA notice-and-take-down scheme, the
copyright owner may send a DMCA copyright notice to the infringing
website.100 To comply with DMCA, the website service provider must
then respond expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material
that the notice identifies as infringing.o1 An Internet service provider
93 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
97 See discussion infra Part II.B.5.
98 Id.
99 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
100 Id. § 512(c).
10 Id.
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can avoid liability by complying with the DMCA notice-and-take-down
scheme,o2 and major websites that deal with user-generated content
can attempt to follow and fall within the DMCA safe harbors. As
illustrated in Brayton Purcell, however, some websites remain
intransigent. This is perhaps because the website owner perceives the
amount at risk as insufficient to justify taking down the infringing
content. Or the website owner may know that litigating copyright
infringement can take several years and decide to simply wear down
the opponent. The proposed scheme addresses such noncompliant
websites, but differs from the DMCA notice-and-take-down scheme in
terms of the process following the take-down recommendation.
The infringing party must, within five business days of receipt of
the decision, submit a statement to the board indicating whether it
will take down the infringing content or appeal.1o3 If the infringing
party agrees to take down the copyrighted content, the board must
determine whether the infringing party complied with the decision
within three months of the issuance of the decision.o4 If the board
determines that the infringing party has not fully complied by the end
of the three months, the board will refer the case to ICANN, which will
seize the domain name.105
102 Id.; id. § 512(i).
103 See discussion infra Part II.B.5.
104 Id.
105 See discussion infra Part IL.B.6.
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Find online copyright infringement
Copyright holder e-mails complaintto the board
Complaint sufficient? no- Correct deficiencies
4yes
Board e-mails complaintto respondent
Respondent e-mails response to the board
Board issues a decision
no
Infringement?
4yes
Recommend to take down the offensive content
Respondent indicatesto take dov
4yes
Respondent complied?
iyes
no
no no Appeal?
Board refers the case to ICANN
for seizing the domain name
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FIG 1. PROPOSED ONLINE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT BY PRIVATE
BOARD
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1. WAIVER OF COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION
As a ground rule, the U.S. statutory prerequisite of copyright
registrationio6 should be waived for the proposed copyright dispute-
resolution system. Registration is currently done by filing a form and
depositing two copies of the work at the Copyright Office.107 The
parties, however, could make title to the copyrighted work clear by
relying on evidentiary submissions, which will be outlined below. The
registration waiver should make the proposed system more efficient.
The statutory prerequisite of copyright registration is only waived for
the proposed ICANN dispute-resolution system. For further appeals to
a federal district court, the copyright holder would still need to
register the work in the conventional way. Therefore, the proposed
registration waiver does not require an overhaul of the current
copyright law.
2. No DISCOVERY
The proposed regulatory scheme would forgo formal discovery and
instead rely on evidentiary submissions by the parties. The evidentiary
submissions may consist of a search result from "Copyscape"0s for
literary works, "TinEye"1o9 for visual arts works, and acoustic
fingerprint software for musical works, coupled with screenshots of
certain web pages from the Internet Archive.lo "Copyscape" is an
Internet application that allows copyright owners to search the
Internet for stolen copies of their articles.,,, "TinEye" is a similar
106 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
107 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2006) ("[T~he owner of copyright or of the exclusive right of
publication in a work published in the United States shall deposit, within three months
after the date of such publication ... two complete copies of the best edition .....
1o8 COPYSCAPE PLAGIARISM CHECKER-DUPLICATE CONTENT DETECTION SOFIWARE,
http://www.copyscape.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
109l TINEYE REVERSE IMAGE SEARCH, http://www.tineye.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
n0 INTERNET ARCHIvE, http://www.archive.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). There maybe
fewer pages available at the Internet Archive in the future due to some companies blocking
automated web crawlers.
" COPYSCAPE PLAGIARISM CHECKER-DUPLICATE CONTENT DETECTION SOFTWARE, supra
note 1o8.
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Internet application that searches online images,112 and the Internet
Archive is an Internet application that allows people to visit archived
versions of stored websites.113 For musical works, there is software
that can be used to identify an audio sample or quickly locate similar
items in an audio database.114 For motion pictures, technology
development is underway to identify uploaded content as a
copyrighted work. For example, companies like Audible Magic and
YouTube are currently working on technologies which could identify
the content of a media file based on its "perceptual characteristics."115
Preliminary tests indicate that these technologies cannot yet identify
all matches.116 Nonetheless, as the industry is moving toward
identification technologies for motion pictures, reliable applications
may be accessible soon and copyright holders would then have an
arsenal of applications at their disposal to perfect evidentiary
submissions.
3. COPYRIGHT HOLDER E-MAILS COMPLAINT TO THE BOARD
Once a copyright holder finds online copyright infringement, the
copyright holder should follow certain steps to file a complaint. First,
the copyright holder should identify the individual organizers and
managers of the infringing website. This can be done by a domain-
name search through a registrar's "Whois database." The copyright
holder should then send a complaint to a dispute-settlement provider
by e-mail. Like in the UDRP, 17 the ICANN may, from time to time,
select a number of dispute-settlement providers for copyright
disputes. The copyright holder may designate any of the accredited
dispute-settlement providers to hear the complaint. The complaint
should provide, at a minimum, the following information: (1) the
112 TINEYE REVERSE IMAGE SEARCH, supra note lo9.
na INTERNET ARCHIVE, supra note 110.
114 Acousticfingerprint, WIKIPEDIA, THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acousticfingerprint#Implementations (last visited Feb. 18,
2012).
115 Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated Content Principles and
the DMCA, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363, 382-83 (2009).
16 Id.
17 See Approved Providers for Unform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, supra
note 41.
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names and e-mail addresses of the copyright holder and the
respondents; (2) the domain name at issue and its registrar; and (3) a
description of the copyrighted content and the purported
infringement. Evidentiary submissions from Copyscape, TinEye, or
the Internet Archive Wayback Machine may be appended to this
complaint. When filing the complaint, the copyright holder must pay a
fee of $1,500 to the dispute-settlement provider."8 If the dispute-
settlement provider does not receive the fee within ten business days
of receiving the complaint, the complaint will be deemed withdrawn
and the dispute resolution terminated.
A three-member board at the dispute-settlement provider will
review the complaint to determine whether it is sufficient. The board
will be comprised of a chief judge and two associate judges. Members
of the board should be experienced attorneys with expertise in
copyright law, litigation, and arbitration.119 ICANN will appoint the
board members and compensate the board from the filing fees. If the
board finds the complaint sufficient, the board will forward the
complaint and its appendices to the respondents by e-mail. Lest the e-
mail to the respondents gets lost, the board will also forward the
complaint by registered mail to all known addresses of the
respondents, as provided by the copyright holder. If, on the other
hand, the complaint is not sufficient, the board will promptly notify
the copyright holder of the nature of the complaint's deficiencies. The
copyright holder will have five business days to correct any
deficiencies, after which the proceeding will be deemed withdrawn
without prejudice.
4. RESPONDENT E-MAILS RESPONSE TO THE BOARD
Within twenty days of the receipt of the complaint, the respondent
must submit a response by e-mail to the dispute-settlement provider.
118 The fee may be reduced or waived if the copyright holder meets certain conditions, such
as having an income less than the average gross income reported by the Department of
Labor for the previous calendar year.
119 Similar qualifications have been proposed for members of a fair-use board in the U.S.
Copyright Office, which would have the power to declare a proposed use of another's
copyrighted work to be a fair use. See Michael W. Carroll, FiXing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REv.
1087, 1124 (2007). It was projected that at least initially the fair-use board may show a pro-
respondent bias. Id. Compared to the fair-use board, the board of the present proposal will
have considerably less discretion in deciding the merits of the case due to the narrow scope
of the copyright dispute. The effect of the board's bias, if any, is therefore mitigated in the
present proposal.
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The response must specifically address the claims in the complaint.
Evidentiary submissions may be appended to the response. A copy of
the response will be sent to the copyright holder by e-mail. There will
be no in-person meetings or teleconferences, unless the dispute-
settlement provider determines that those are necessary for deciding
the complaint. The respondent need not pay any fee to the dispute-
settlement provider when submitting the response.
Like in the UDRP 20 or NAD process, 1 2 1 the board should have
broad discretion to determine the significance of a party's default. In a
large number of UDRP decisions, respondents fail to appear or to
defend against trademark owners' complaints.122 Yet many of these
default cases involve abusive, bad-faith registration23 of domain
names. Therefore, if a party, absent exceptional circumstances, fails to
answer the complaint, the UDRP panel draws "such inferences
therefrom as it considers appropriate."124 The NAD treats a party's
default similarly.125 For the UDRP, the seemingly harsh treatment on a
party's default has been justified by the fact that "[i]t requires little
cost or effort to participate in UDRP panel proceedings."12 6 A similar
rationale may apply to the NAD process. The proposed regulatory
scheme is also inexpensive and quick, militating to a similar treatment
on a party's default. Therefore, in the proposed regulatory scheme, if
the respondent does not submit a response, or if the dispute-
settlement provider receives notification of non-delivery of the
120 Rules for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN,
http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-ruleS-24oct99.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
12 The Advertising Industry's Process of Voluntary Self-Regulation, supra note 76, at 7.
122 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 37, at 216 (citing Analysis of Key UDRP Issues,
BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/udrp/analysis.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2012)).
123 See supra note 39.
124 Rules for Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, supra note 120.
125 First, the NAD "release[s] to the press and the public a 'notice' summarizing the
advertising claims challenged in the complaint, and noting the [party]'s failure to
substantively respond." The Advertising Industry's Process of Voluntary Self-Regulation,
supra note 76, at 7. After an additional fifteen business days, the NAD "may refer the file to
the appropriate government agency and release information regarding the referral to the
press, the public, and the media in which the advertising at issue has appeared, and shall
report the referral in the next issue of the Case Reports." Id.
126 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 37, at 216.
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complaint, the dispute-settlement provider shall decide the dispute
based upon the complaint, absent exceptional circumstances.
5. BOARD ISSUES A DECISION
Within sixty days of the receipt of the complaint, the three-
member board will issue a decision in writing. If the board finds that
the respondent infringed upon the claimant's website, the decision is a
recommendation to take down the offensive content, as in the NAD
process or the DMCA notice-and-take-down scheme. The decision will
be published on a publicly accessible website and also forwarded, by e-
mail and registered mail, to each party, the concerned domain-name
registrar, and ICANN. The bad publicity will nudge the respondent
toward taking down the offensive content and deter future
infringements. The board would face a steady number of cases
presenting similar issues and defenses; thus, the collective expertise of
the board members will be honed over time and a coherent body of
jurisprudence created, providing guidance to Internet users.
The infringing party must, within five business days of receipt of
the decision, submit a concise statement to the board indicating
whether it will take down the offensive content or appeal. If the
infringing party agrees to take down the offensive content, the board
must determine whether the infringing party complied with the
decision within three months of the issuance of the decision. As in the
transmittal of a complaint, no response from the infringing party will
be treated as an agreement to take down the offensive content. If,
however, the infringing party disagrees with the board's decision and
chooses to appeal the issue, its reasons must be explained in the
statement.
6. BOARD CAN REFER THE CASE TO ICANN
If the infringing party agrees to take down the offensive content
but has not fully complied within three months of the issuance of the
decision, the board will refer the case to ICANN so it can seize the
domain name pursuant to the domain-name registration agreement.
Also, if the infringing party fails to submit a statement altogether, the
board may refer the matter to ICANN and ICANN could implement a
domain-name seizure through the concerned registrar. If the
infringing party chooses to take the issues to appeal, however, no
action would be taken on the domain name.
ICANN can rely on its standard domain-name registration
agreement to terminate noncompliant domain names. ICANN has
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exclusive control of the DNS and conditions access to it on a
registrant's consent to a host of substantive rules.127 One such rule in a
standard domain-name registration agreement prohibits the use of
domain names for "illegal purposes."128 Because straightforward
copyright infringement, such as web cloning, is unambiguously illegal,
ICANN can rely on its standard domain-name registration agreement
to terminate noncompliant domain names and thereby enforce
copyright online.
This interpretation of the domain-name registration agreement
may sound inventive to some minds. Nonetheless, it is necessary for
this proposal because there is currently no provision in a registration
agreement directly speaking to copyright disputes. For UDRP, the
implementation of the regulatory scheme was more straightforward,
in that the UDRP itself was made part of the domain-name
registration agreement. One could argue that we can similarly add a
provision expressly providing for mandatory arbitration in copyright
disputes. But such provision may only apply prospectively, lest it raise
ex post factol29 concerns. Courts have disfavored retroactive
legislationl3o and may similarly disfavor retroactive private regulation.
To illustrate how a new provision for mandatory arbitration would
work, suppose there are copyright holders who wish to enforce their
copyright against websites. The provision for mandatory arbitration
would selectively apply against some websites but not others, and an
unnecessary confusion may ensue for copyright holders. To effectuate
a broad remedial purpose against online copyright infringement, it
would therefore be preferable to interpret the registration agreement
as described above, rather than to add a new provision.
Websites have been shut down under a similar theory in the past.
In a case involving voteauction.com, a website soliciting voters to sell
and buy votes, the Board of Election Commissioner of the City of
Chicago filed a civil lawsuit to shut the site down.131 To effectively
127 Id. at 238.
128 See, e.g., Perritt, supra note 26, at 242.
129 The phrase is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "after the fact" or "retroactively."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
130 See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 223 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
131 Prelim. Inj. Order, Bd. of Election Comm'rs of the City of Chi. v. Bernhard, No. oo CE
031 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 18, 2000), available at http://www.vote-
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enforce judgment against the website, the commissioners named the
website's individual organizers, managers, and the domain name
registry, Domain Bank, as defendants.132 Domain Bank had a standard
domain-registration agreement prohibiting domain-name use for
illegal purposes.133 Invoking this provision, the commissioners
successfully argued that when a website's content solicits voters to sell
and buy votes, the domain name is being used for illegal purposes. An
injunction was enforced against voteauction.com's domain name.134
Immediately after the court order, voteauction.com opened up under
a new domain name, "vote-auction.com," which was registered in
Switzerland with the International Council of Registrars ("CORE").135
But CORE also had a prohibition against illegal uses in its standard
domain name registration agreement and vote-auction.com was again
shut down.136 Then voteauction.com tried to publicize its numerical
network address, but the voting had ended by this time.137
The possibility of a domain-name seizure in the proposed
regulatory scheme is not an intrusive penalty, given that the website
owner may always register another domain name. Moreover, even if
the domain name is seized, the numerical network address itself and
the infringing content appearing on the website remain untouched.
Nonetheless, the possibility of a domain-name seizure will provide an
effective nudge, because a domain name remains one of a website's
most important assets. Some insights in this regard can be gleaned
from the immediate reaction triggered when Google removes a
domain name from its index. On February 4, 2006, Google removed
the car manufacturer BMW's German website BMW.de for breaching
auction.net/ARCHIVE/olLAWSUITS/CHICAGO/207.70.85.119-LAWSUITSDIGIT
AL/preliminary%2oinjunction%200rde.htm.
132 Id.
133 Perritt, supra note 26, at 242.
134 Id.
135 Pis.' Emergency Verified Pet. for Rule to Show Cause, Bd. of Election Comm'rs of the
City of Chi. v. Bernhard, No. o CE 031, 3 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 30, 20oo), available at
http://www.vote-
auction.net/ARCHIVE/olLAWSUITS/CHICAGOII/JPG/Teil%2oloo3.jPg.
136 Perritt, supra note 26, at 242.
137 Id. at 242-43.
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the guidelines on webspam.138 Webspam is a technique to mislead
Google's indexing system in order to boost search rankings, for
example by using pages which are stuffed with hidden keywords.139
The BBC news lamented that BMW was given a "death penalty" by
Google.140 Three days later, BMW removed the troublesome webspam
and was re-included in Google's index.141 If removing a website from a
search engine is perceived as an effective penalty, seizing the domain
name, or the possibility of it, would be a substantial deterrent against
copyright infringement. Research has proven that people are averse to
incurring losses, which can be leveraged as a ground for a cognitive
nudge.142 The proposed regulatory scheme will leverage the deterrent
of seizing a domain name or the possibility to do so to foster self-
regulation on the Internet.
7. ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED REGULATORY SCHEME
The proposed regulatory scheme has two major advantages over
the prior proposals. First, it does not require amending the copyright
law because it relies on a private board, which ICANN can implement
through select dispute-settlement providers. As a corollary,
government resources are not needed to implement or execute the
proposed regulatory scheme. In fact, the proposed regulatory scheme
would impose no burdens on taxpayers because the board would be
funded by the filing fee. Additionally, the proposed regulatory scheme
substantially eliminates jurisdictional problems because the only
enforcement would come in the form of domain-name seizure, of
which ICANN has exclusive control. ICANN's control of domain
names transcends national borders. As we have seen, standard
138 Matt Cutts, Ramping Up on International Webspam, MAr Currs: GADGETS, GOOGLE,
AND SEO (Feb. 4, 2006), http://www.mattcutts.com/blog/ramping-up-on-international-
webspam.
139 See Matt Cutts, SEO Mistakes: Spam in other languages, MATr CUrS: GADGETS,
GOOGLE, AND SEO (Jan. 11, 2006), http://www.mattcutts.com/blog/seo-mistakes-spam-
in-other-languages.
140 BMW Given Google "Death Penalty", BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/4685750.stm (last updated Feb. 6, 2006 15:31
GMT).
141 Matt Cutts, Recent Reinclusions, MArT CUrS: GADGETS, GOOGLE, AND SEO (Feb. 7,
2006), http://www.mattcutts.com/blog/recent-reinclusions.
142 Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 20, at 33-34.
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domain-name registration agreements can be reasonably interpreted
to prohibit the use of domain names for straightforward copyright
infringement, thereby supporting the enforcement. Because there is
no new provision to opt in for the regulatory scheme, the scheme
would be mandatory for every website. Although the scheme itself is
mandatory, compliance is voluntary. To effectively nudge websites
towards reducing the number of copyright infringement cases, the
regulatory scheme deliberately exploits the loss-aversion heuristics,
structures the take-down of offensive content as a default, and gives
feedback to Internet users by publishing the take-down
recommendation on a publicly accessible website.
III. CRITICISMS OF PRIVATE REGULATION
Because the proposed copyright dispute-resolution scheme follows
certain elements of the UDRP, critics may object to it based on the
structural problems that have been noted for the UDRP. As described
in the prior part,143 however, the proposed scheme relies heavily on
self-regulation without imposing an intrusive penalty, and thereby
mitigates the overreaching effect of the UDRP. The most glaring defect
of UDRP, lack of an administrative appeal, will be addressed in this
part. This part will also deal with the question of how meaningful the
proposed scheme is, given that it governs a somewhat narrow class of
conflicts.
A. THE COPYRIGHT DISPUTE RESOLUTION SCHEME
PERMITS JUDICIAL REVIEW
The proposed hybrid regulation relies on the self-regulation of
private actors without losing government oversight. To protect against
errors and to preserve a litigant's Seventh Amendment right to a trial
by jury,144 the proposed copyright dispute resolution scheme permits
judicial review. A losing party retains the right to appeal the judgment
to a federal district court, which would review the claim de novo. If the
infringing party files an appeal, no action is taken on the domain
name.
143 See supra Part II.B.
144 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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B. ONLINE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT PROVIDES A MEANINGFUL
REMEDY TO COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
The proposed copyright dispute-resolution scheme is deliberately
structured to govern a narrow class of conflicts, and therefore may be
criticized for not addressing the more compelling legal issues facing
the copyright law in the 21st century. However, enforcing
straightforward claims of online copyright infringement is not
frivolous. On the contrary, enforcing straightforward claims serves an
important public purpose of preventing a real injury.
If we cannot resolve the technically straightforward claims of
online copyright infringement, such as web cloning or news
aggregation, we cannot resolve the more complex claims. The
limitations of the current judicial system show that even the most
straightforward claims cannot be practicably resolved today. Most of
the time, the economics of a case militate against its being filed and,
therefore, the case may never get the attention of the court. Moreover,
when it does get filed, the court may be handicapped by jurisdictional
concerns. The proposed regulatory scheme provides a way to
effectively enforce copyright in such a case.
Once adopted, the proposed regulatory scheme may be extended
to other forms of infringement that are not so straightforward. For
example, there are websites that are operated overseas, such as
ThePirateBay.org,145 hosting third-party content for public
distribution. If copyright holders could show that a multitude of their
works are being infringed on such a website, they may file a complaint
at the proposed board and obtain a take-down recommendation.
Perhaps some websites would be intransigent, even in the face of bad
publicity. But then there is the possibility that ICANN will step in and
seize the domain name. Seizure of the domain name, or the possibility
of it, should make a difference in how websites handle copyright
infringement. And this outcome would be quite different from what
actually happened to ThePirateBay.org under the current public-law
framework: In a criminal trial, the operators of the website were found
guilty of assistance to copyright infringement and sentenced to one
year in prison, but the website itself remained unaffected.146 The
proposed regulatory scheme could provide a more meaningful remedy
to copyright holders.
145DOWNLOAD Music, MOVIES, GAMES, SOFTWARE! THE PIRATE BAY,
http://www.thepiratebay.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
146 Karl Ritter, 4 Convicted in Pirate Bay File-Sharing Trial, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2009-o4-17-pirate-bayN.htm.
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CONCLUSION
A private regulatory scheme under ICANN for copyright
enforcement could address the shortcomings of the current public-law
framework. Litigation can be ineffective to enforce copyright on the
Internet because it is typically expensive, slow, and fraught with
jurisdictional uncertainties. Under the proposed hybrid regulatory
scheme, a private board of a dispute-settlement provider under
ICANN would hear straightforward claims of online copyright
infringement, subject to judicial review. This regulatory scheme would
nudge websites to voluntarily take down the offensive content because
otherwise ICANN could seize the domain name pursuant to the
domain-name registration agreement.

